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The EEC Convention on Jurisdiction
and Enforcement of Civil and
Commercial Judgments
Elizabeth Freeman*
As the result of a Protocol to the EEC Convention on Jurisdiction and
Enforcement of Civil and Commercial Judgments, the European Court of
Justice was express given jurisdiction to interpret the Convention's provi-
sions. The European Court, in interpreting the Convention, has adopted
Community solutions and common Community law definitions. In addition,
the European Court has narrowly construed exceptions to the Convention's
basic princples. The Court has also attempted to guarantee equality of
treatment. In this article, Mrs. Freeman examines the European Court's
application of these principles in light of the Convention's purpose and
structure.
INTRODUCTION
In 1968 the original six Member States of the European Economic
Community entered into the Convention on Jurisdiction and Enforce-
ment of Civil and Commercial Judgments' in pursuance of their obli-
gations under Article 220 of the EEC Treaty.2 Although Article 220
does not expressly require that treaties are necessary to implement its
obligations, it has always been assumed that the reference to "negotia-
* M.A., LL.B., Cantab; LL.M., Harvard University; Lic. Sp. en Dr. Eur., Brussels. Fellow,
Clare College, Cambridge.
1 Convention on Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial
Matters, Sept. 27, 1968, 15 J.O. COMM. EUR. (No. L 299) 32 (1972) (entered intoforce Feb. 1, 1973)
[hereinafter cited as Convention]. For subsequent amendments and adjustments, see notes 11-14
and accompanying text infra. The official English version of the Convention was prepared at the
time of the accession of Denmark, Ireland and the United Kingdom, 21 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L
304) 36 (1978).
2 Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, Mar. 25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 11
(entered into force Jan. 1, 1958) [hereinafter cited as EEC Treaty].
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tions" carries the necessary implication that treaties, rather than regula-
tions or directives, are the appropriate form of implementation.
Consequently, the implementing treaties do not automatically form
part of the legislative framework of the EEC, and thus do not benefit
from the doctrine of direct applicability under Article 189.1
The Judgment Convention's form as a parallel convention to the
EEC Treaty raised some doubt concerning whether the European
Court of Justice had jurisdiction to interpret its provisions. A separate
protocol was therefore thought necessary to confer this jurisdiction on
the European Court; it was added to the Convention in 1971, and came
into force in 1975.' The procedure laid down is similar to that in Arti-
cle 177 of the EEC Treaty,5 although not identical. In particular, the
power of referral is largely restricted to national appellate courts.
6
Problems may arise where an appeal does not take place, thus increas-
ing the risk of contradictory first instance decisions. Another issue
stemming from this form of implementation concerns the supremacy of
Community law in this context.7 As it seems to regard this Convention
as part of the entire corpus of Community law, the Court would argua-
bly also apply the doctrine of supremacy to it, thus giving the Conven-
tion precedence over any later national law. However, it is
questionable whether all national courts would agree.' This article will
focus on the European Court's exercise of jurisdiction in interpreting
the Judgments Convention.'
In the twenty-six preliminary rulings10 now rendered on the Con-
vention, the Court has applied three basic principles in its interpreta-
tion: first, that concepts in the Convention be given a common
3 1d at art. 189.
4 Protocol on the Interpretation by the Court of Justice of the Convention of Sept. 27, 1968
on Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters, June 3,
1971, 21 OJ. EuR. Comm. (No. L 304) 50 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Protocol].
5 EEC Treaty, supra note 2, at art. 177.
6 Protocol, supra note 4, at art. 2.
7 See, eg., McLellan, The Convention of Brussels of Sept. 27, 1968 on Jurisdiction and the
Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters, 15 Comm. MKT. L.
Rnv. 228 (1978).
8 See, ag., McLellan's discussion of the Pretore of Brescia decision of Oct. 25, 1975. Id at
229.
9 The extensive case law on the Convention resulting from decisions of national courts in the
original six Member States, however, will not be examined.
10 Five recent decisions, not examined in this article, are Blanckaert and Willems v. Trost,
[1981] E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 819 (preliminary ruling); Re Siegfried Edwald Rinkau, Case 157/80,
May 26, 1981 (not yet reported); Peter Klomps v. Karl Michel, Case 166/80, June 16, 1981 (not yet
reported); Elefanten Schuh GmbH v. Jacquain, Case 150/80, June 24, 1981 (not yet reported);
S.A. Ets. Rohr v. Ossberger, Oct. 22, 1981 (not yet reported).
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Community law definition; second, that exceptions to the basic rules of
the Convention be construed strictly; and third, that equality of treat-
ment be guaranteed.
Before examining these principles in detail, a word must be said
about the developments resulting from the Accession of the new Mem-
ber States to the Community in 1973.11 Article 3 of the Act Concerning
the Conditions of Accession' 2 provided that the new Member States
would accede to this Convention; however, dissatisfaction with certain
aspects of the 1968 Convention itself led to lengthy negotiations. The
revised Convention was annexed to the Convention of Accession,
which was signed by the nine Member States in October, 1978.13 At
present, however, only the original six Member States have ratified it,
and therefore, it is not yet in force. 4 Ratification in the United King-
dom will first require the appropriate legislation; the Civil Jurisdiction
and Judgments Bill' 5 was introduced into Parliament in November,
1981, and is expected to become law by the summer of 1982.
As its name indicates, the Judgments Convention deals with the
twin topics of jurisdiction and recognition of foreign judgments. Arti-
11 Treaty Concerning the Accession of the Kingdom of Denmark, Ireland, the Kingdom of
Norway, and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the European Eco-
nomic Community, Jan. 22, 1972, 15 J.O. COMM. EUR. (No. L 73) 5 (1972), translated in [1972] 2
COMM. MKT. REP. (CCH) 7011 (entered into force Jan. 1, 1973) [hereinafter cited as Accession
Treaty]. Norway failed to ratify the agreement following a negative referendum on the issue of
becoming a member of the Community. As a result, only Denmark, Ireland and the United King-
dom became new Member States in 1973.
12 Act Concerning the Conditions of Accession and the Adjustments to the Treaties, 15 J. 0.
COMM. EUR. (No. L 73) 14 (1972), translated in [1972] 2 COMM. MKT. REP. (CCH) 7031 [herein-
after cited as Act of Accession]. Article 3 of the Act of Accession provides that:
[t]he new Member States undertake to accede to the conventions provided for in Article 220
of the EEC Treaty, and to the protocols on the interpretation of those conventions by the
Court of Justice, signed by the original Member States, and to this end they undertake to
enter into negotiations with the original Member States in order to make the necessary ad-
justments thereto.
Id
13 As a result of the negotiations between the original and new Member States, a number of
adjustments were made to the 1968 Judgments Convention, note I supra, by the Convention of
Accession of Oct. 9, 1978, 21 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 304) 1 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Conven-
tion of Accession]. The text of the Judgments Convention of 1968, as amended by the Convention
of Accession, can be found at 21 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 304) 77 (1978) [hereinafter, the 1968
Judgment Convention as amended by the Convention of Accession will be cited as Judgments
Convention].
14 Article 39 of the Convention of Accession, note 13 supra, provides that the Convention of
Accession "shall enter into force, as between the States which shall have ratified it ... following
... ratification by the original Member States of the Community and one new Member State."
Since none of the new Member States has yet ratified the Convention of Accession, it is not yet in
force.
15 Published on Nov. 10, 1981.
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cle 2, containing the basic principle regarding jurisdiction states that
persons domiciled in a Contracting State shall, whatever their national-
ity, be sued in the courts of that State. 6 Although the concept of domi-
cile is not defined in the Convention, Article 5217 provides that in
determining whether a party is domiciled in a particular State, the law
of that State shall apply. This creates problems in relation to the U.K.,
since "domicile" has a restrictive technical meaning in English law.
The Bill therefore provides'" that an individual is domiciled in the
United Kingdom for the purposes of the Convention if and only if
(i) he is resident in the United Kingdom and (ii) the nature and circum-
stances of his residence indicate that he has a substantial connection
with the United Kingdom. As has been pointed out,19 the Convention
is far-reaching, and differs from other Conventions on mutual recogni-
tion and enforcement of judgments. It differs in that it first introduces
uniform rules on jurisdiction, and then demands automatic recognition
by courts in other Member States. The basic rule on recognition re-
quires the courts in the recognizing state to accept judgments given by
the courts of other states without the former being entitled to consider
whether the court granting the judgment had jurisdiction.
SCOPE OF THE CONVENTION
The Judgments Convention is generally applicable to civil and
commercial matters. Article 1,20 however, expressly exempts a number
of matters from the provisions of the Convention. The boundaries of
Article 1 have led to problems of interpretation, with a number of cases
having already come before the European Court.
In LZTU v. Eurocontrol,2 1 the European Court of Justice was called
16 Judgments Convention, supra note 13, at art. 2.
17 Id at art. 52.
18 Civil Jurisdiction and Judgments Bill, supra note 15, at cl. 38.
19 See, Bartlett, Full Faith and Credit Comes to the Common M4arket: An Analysis of the Provi-
sions of the Convention on Jurisdiction and Enforcement of Judgment in Civil and Commercial Mat-
ters, 24 INTL' & CoMP. L.Q. 44 (1975).
20 Article I of the Judgments Convention, note 13 supra, provides that it:
... shall apply in civil and commercial matters whatever the nature of the court or tribunal.
It shall not extend, in particular, to revenue, customs or administrative matters. The Conven-
tion shall not apply to:
1. The status or legal capacity of natural persons, rights in property arising out of a matri-
monial relationship, wills and succession;
2. bankruptcy, proceedings relating to the winding up of insolvent companies or other legal
persons, judicial arrangements, compositions and analogous proceedings;
3. social security;
4. arbitration.
21 LTU Lufttansportunternehmen v. Eurocontrol, [1976] E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1541, [1977] 1
Comm. Mkt. L.R. 88.
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upon to interpret the concept of "civil and commercial matters" within
the meaning of Article 1. LTU, a German air transport firm, disputed
the validity of certain charges imposed by Eurocontrol, an interna-
tional organization providing various air safety services. Eurocontrol
successfuly brought proceedings before a Belgian Court, with the latter
finding the claims commercial in nature: Eurocontrol then sought to
enforce the judgment in Germany. The German Court referred to the
European Court the interpretation of "civil and commercial matters"
and, in particular, the question of which law should apply when decid-
ing this question. The European Court's ruling largely concerned
whether the concept should have a Community law meaning, or
whether it should be governed by national law. It then held that where
the public authority was acting in the exercise of its powers, as was
Eurocontrol, such a case would lie outside the scope of the Conven-
tion.22 If, on the other hand, the authority had been acting as a private
citizen, the Convention would apply.23 This ruling rendered the judg-
ment against LTU unenforceable on the basis of the Convention. This
unfavorable decision prompted Eurocontrol to pursue a different
method of enforcement. In Bavaria Fluggesellschaft v. Eurocontrol,24
Eurocontrol had obtained judgments in Belgium against two other air
transport companies in the same circumstances as in the LTU case.
However, it sought to enforce them not on the basis of the Judgments
Convention but on the basis of a bilateral convention between Ger-
many and Belgium, 25 also limited in scope to civil and commercial
matters. The parties to this bilateral convention, however, had agreed
that classification of the judgment would turn upon the law of the judg-
ment-granting country. The Bundesgerichtshof referred to the Euro-
pean Court the question of whether the Judgments Convention
precluded the application of the bilateral Convention, and the Court
held that it did not. Although Article 55 of the Judgments Conven-
tion 26 stated that it superseded the Convention between Germany and
22 Id at 1552, [1977] 1 Comm. Mkt. L. R. at 101.
23 Id
24 [1977] E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1517, [1980] 1 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 566.
25 Convention between the Federal Republic of Germany and the Kingdom of Belgium on
the Mutual Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments, Arbitration Awards and Authentic In-
struments in Civil and Commercial Matters, June 30, 1958, 387 U.N.T.S. 245.
26 Article 55 of the Judgments Convention, note 13 supra, specifically provides that the Judg-
ments Convention supersedes the Convention between the Federal Republic of Germany and the
Kingdom of Belgium on the Mutual Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments, Arbitration
Awards and Authentic Instruments in Civil and Commercial Matters signed at Bonn on June 30,
1958.
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Belgium, Article 5627 confines this to only those matters to which the
Judgments Convention applies. Since the European Court had already
held in the LTU case that the Judgments Convention did not apply to
such a case, it was clear, therefore, that the bilateral Convention could
apply. The European Court correctly noted that it had no jurisdiction
to interpret the bilateral Convention, and thus could not rule the case
as being outside it. These cases demonstrate that the concept of "civil
and commercial matters" can have different meanings under the two
Conventions.
A public authority was also involved in the recent case of Nether-
lands State v. Riiffer.28 The European Court decided that an action
brought by the agent responsible for administering public waterways in
Holland was not covered by the Convention. A Dutch and a German
vessel had collided on a public waterway. The Dutch authority re-
moved the wreck of the sunken vessel and demanded reimbursement
from the German vessel's owner. The Court held that the case in-
volved the exercise of public authority, and therefore did not fall within
the scope of "civil and commercial matters."29
The European Court has also had the opportunity to consider the
interpretation of matters specifically excluded from the Convention's
scope. In Gourdain v. Nadler,3" it pronounced on "the winding-up of
insolvent companies," and in De Cavel v. De Cavel (No. 1),31 on the
"status or legal capacity of natural persons" and "rights in property
arising out of a matrimonial relationship." Gourdain, concerned the
liquidation in France of a German company's French subsidiary. The
assets of the French company were insufficient to meet its liabilities,
and pursuant to the French law of 1967,32 the liquidator brought an
action before a French court against the German managing director of
the parent company. The proceedings were successful in France, and
enforcement in Germany was sought under the Convention. The Eu-
ropean Court then had to determine whether the judgment of the
French court was outside the scope of the Convention. It analyzed the
action closely, and found that the judgment was indeed linked with the
27 Article 56 of the Judgments Convention, note 13 supra, provides that the "Treaty and the
conventions referred to in Article 55 shall continue to have effect in relation to matters to which
this Convention does not apply."
28 Netherlands State v. Rtiffer, [1980] E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 3807, [1981] 3 Comm. Mkt. L.R.
293.
29 Id
30 [1979] E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 733, [1979] 3 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 180.
31 [1979] E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1055, [1979] 2 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 547.
32 2 C. CoMm. Law No. 67-563 (July 13, 1967), [1967] J.O. 7059, [1967] B.L.D. 572.
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liquidation, and therefore excluded from the scope of the
Convention.33
De Cavel (No. 1) concerned protective measures granted by a court
during divorce proceedings in France. The couple had apartments in
both Frankfurt and Cannes, and the interim order of the French court
prohibited the wife's removal of property from both homes. The hus-
band then applied to the German courts for enforcement of the order.
In deciding whether such a case fell outside the scope of the Conven-
tion, the European Court's ruling was rather ambiguous, except in its
finding that interim measures must be treated in the same manner as
final measures. The Court held that orders for provisional protective
measures did not fall within the Convention if they concerned or were
closely connected with either questions of the status of persons in-
volved in the divorce proceedings, or of proprietary legal relations re-
sulting directly from the matrimonial relationship or its dissolution.34
Although not expressly stated, the implication therefore was that the De
Cavel (No. 1) case fell outside the scope of the Convention. The Court
also indicated that such measures could fall within the Convention if
they concerned property rights unconnected with the marriage. 35 The
abstract nature of the Court's ruling in this case is, of course, the result
of the reference procedure, under which the Court is not asked to de-
cide the case, but merely to interpret the provisions of Community law
at issue. It is well known in other areas of Community law that this
rule tends to lead to ambiguity in the Court's reply. In further litiga-
tion, the De Cavel (No. 1) divorce afforded the European Court an op-
portunity to determine the scope of the Convention, this time in
relation to maintenance payments. In De Cave? v. De Cavel (No. 2),36
Mrs. De Cavel argued that maintenance was a civil matter within Arti-
cle 1, and did not fall within the express exclusions. She said that this
view was confirmed by the express reference to maintenance in Article
5(2), 3 by the text of the Convention of Accession, 38 by the Jenard Re-
33 Gourdain v. Nadler, [1979] E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 733, [1979] 3 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 180. The
holding in Gourdain was based upon subpara. 2 of the second para. of Article I of the Convention
which provides that the Convention shall not apply to "bankruptcy, proceedings relating to the
winding-up of insolvent companies or other legal persons, judicial arrangements, compositions
and analogous proceedings." Judgments Convention, supra note 13, at art. I.
34 De Cavel v. De Cavel, [1979] E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1055, [1979] 2 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 180.
35 Disputes relating to the assets of spouses in the course of divorce proceedings that involve
proprietary legal relations having no connection with the marriage may fall within the scope of the
Convention. De Cavel v. De Cavel, [1979] E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at 1066, [1979] 2 Comm. Mkt.
L.R. at 559.
36 [1980] E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 731, [1980] 3 Comm. Mkt. L.R. I.
37 Article 5(2) establishes the jurisdiction for suits:
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port,39 by the Schlosser Report,40 and by various national decisions,
notably those of the Oberlandesgericht, Karlsruhe on June 4, 197641
and of the Cour d'Appel, Brussels, on April 1, 1977.42 Mr. De Cavel,
on the other hand, relied on the generality of the answer in De Cavel
(No. 1), which he said also covered claims for a maintenance allow-
ance. The European Court rejected the view that ancillary proceedings
are infected by the nature of the principal claim, and in finding for
Mrs. De Cavel ruled that the Convention applies to the enforcement of
a maintenance order as well as to monthly compensation payments
under Article 270 Code Civile,43 which the European Court thought to
be in the nature of maintenance. The Court found that such payments
fell within the concept of civil matters, and, therefore, were not
excluded.44
The case law analysis above clearly demonstrates the European
Court's broad interpretation of "civil and commercial matters." This is
quite justifiable, for it is the Convention's aim to provide as wide a
basis as possible for the harmonization of jurisdictional rules and the
enforcement of foreign judgments. The exclusions contained in Article
1 will, on the other hand, be construed narrowly, as De Cavel (No. 2)
illustrates. This policy is consistent with other rulings of the European
Court on the exceptions to the general principles of the Convention,
discussed below.
in matters relating to maintenance, in the courts for the place where the maintenance
creditor is domiciled or, if the matter is ancillary to proceedings concerning the status of a
person, in the court which, according to its own law, has jurisdiction to entertain those pro-
ceedings, unless that jurisdiction is based solely on the nationality of one of the parties ...
Judgments Convention, supra note 13, at art. 5(2).
38 Convention of Accession, note 13 supra.
39 Report on the Convention on Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and
Commercial Matters, 22 0. J. Eut. COMM. (No. C 59) 1 (1979) (Report published by a committee
of experts responsible for drafting the original Convention. Its rapporteur, Mr. P. Jenard, was
Director d'Administration in the Belgium Ministry for Foreign Affairs and External Trade) [here-
inafter cited as Jenard Report].
40 Report on the Convention of Accession, 22 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. C 59) 71 (1979) (Report
published by committee of experts responsible for drafting the Convention of Accession. Its rap-
porteur, Dr. Peter Schlosser, was Professor of Law at the University of Munich) [hereinafter cited
as Schlosser Report].
41 DOCUMENTATION BRANCH OF THE COURT OF JUSTICE OF THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION,
SYNOPSIS OF CASELAW, Part 2, No. 54 (1978).
42 JOURNAL DES TRiuNEAux 119 (1978).
43 C. Civ., art. 270.
44 De Cavel v. De Cavel (No. 2), [1980] E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 731, [1980] 3 Comm. Mkt. L.R.
1.
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THE THREE PRINCIPLES
A. Community Concepts
In Tessili v. Dunlop,a5 the first case decided by the European Court
under the Convention, the Court was cautious about imposing a Com-
munity solution for every problem of interpretation that could arise.
The Court was perhaps influenced by the approach in the Convention
itself, wherein Articles 52 and 53 refer questions of domicile and the
seat of a company back to national law. According to some commenta-
tors, there is therefore no need for the Court to produce Community
solutions to problems of interpretation, but instead, merely to indicate
which national law applies. This is precisely what the Court did in this
first case.
The case involved the sale of goods. Dunlop, a German company,
bought ski suits from the Italian company Tessili, and later found they
were defective. Dunlop thereafter brought an action in Germany seek-
ing to annul the contract, and Tessili contested jurisdiction. Dunlop
relied on Article 5(1) of the Convention.4 6 Tessili argued that the
"place of performance of the obligation" must always be the seller's
domicile or registered place of business. Dunlop, on the other hand,
argued that since domicile is an independent ground for jurisdiction
under Article 2, Article 5(1) would be meaningless if Tessili's view were
adopted. Dunlop thought that the place of the obligation's perform-
ance should be determined by the proper law of the contract under the
conflict rules of the forum. The European Court adopted the plaintiff's
view. Furthermore, the Court added that it was unnecessary to adopt
an independent uniform meaning for every concept in the Conven-
tion,4 7 stating instead that such decision depends on which method best
fulfills the objective laid down in Article 220.
Since Tessili v. Dunlop, however, the Court has in a number of
cases favored the approach of adopting a Community solution. This
was first apparent in LTU v. Eurocontrol, already discussed above.48 In
LTU, the Advocate General had rejected a Community law meaning
for the phrase "civil and commercial matters" on the grounds of uncer-
tainty. He thought it would lead to endless references to the European
45 [1976] E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1473, [1977] 1 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 26.
46 Article 5(1) of the Convention provides that:
[a] person domiciled in a contracting State may, in another contracting State, be sued:
I. in matters relating to a contract, in the courts of the place of performance of the obliga-
tion in question....
Judgments Convention, supra note 13, at art. 5(1).
47 Tessili v. Dunlop, [1976] E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1473, [1977] 1 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 26.
48 See notes 21-24 and accompanying text supra.
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Court, thus frustrating the purpose of the Convention, since it would
interfere with the enforcement of judgments. The European Court,
nevertheless, held that the concept must have a Community law mean-
ing, and that its meaning could not depend upon national law, because
if it did the obligations would not be uniform for all Contracting
States.4 9 It found this view to be supported by the disregard in Article
I for the nature of the court or tribunal. The Court went on to say that:
[t]he concept in question must be regarded as independent and must be
interpreted by reference, first, to the objectives and scheme of the Con-
vention and, secondly, to the general principles which stem from the
corpus of the national legal systems.5
The Court has been criticized for introducing uncertainty and for
relying on general principles of law, notoriously difficult to establish.
The Court is going no further here, however, than it does in other areas
of Community law, and its approach can be justified by its deep-seated
desire to impose a uniform solution. Uniformity, of course, is difficult
enough to achieve in the context of the reference procedure, especially
when ap curtailed as it is under the Protocol.5 Indeed part of the rea-
son for adopting a Community solution may be that it serves to en-
courage references by the national courts, since they cannot really
decide on the Community solution for themselves. However, if the Eu-
ropean Court consistently adopted the solution of referring points back
to national law, the national courts would be more reluctant to refer,
and would probably decide the cases themselves without a reference.
The European Court has in fact used the principle of legal cer-
tainty in order to justify the adoption of Community solutions. In
Somafer v. Saar-Ferngas, the Court emphasized that:
the need to ensure legal certainty and equality of rights and obligations
for the parties as regards the power to derogate from the general jurisdic-
tion of Article 2 requires an independent interpretation, common to all
the Contracting States,. .52
In this case, Ferngas brought an action in Germany against Somafer, a
French company with its registered office and principal place of busi-
ness in France. The suit concerned certain demolition work under-
taken by Somafer in Germany. Ferngas relied on Article 5(5) of the
Convention, which gives jurisdiction in a dispute arising out of the op-
erations of a branch, agency or other establishment, to the courts where
49 LTU Lufttransportunternehmen v. Eurocontrol, [1976] E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1541, [1977] 1
Comm. Mkt. L.R. 88.
50 Id at 1551, [1977] 1 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 100.
51 Protocol, note 4 supra.
52 [1978] E. Comm. Ct. . Rep. 2183, 2193, [1979] 1 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 490, 504.
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the branch, agency or other establishment is situated. Somafer's
notepaper gave an address in Germany, and Ferngas argued that this
was enough to give the German courts jurisdiction on the grounds that
Somafer had held itself out as having an establishment in Germany.
Although the European Court adopted a Community solution, and re-
jected the argument that Article 5(5) should be interpreted according to
the lexfori or the lex causae, it indicated that strict criteria still had to
be met for Article 5(5) to apply.53 When the Court said that the local
entity must have a place of business and a management, and must be
"materially equipped" to negotiate with third parties, it was impliedly
rejecting the view that mere holding out would be sufficient.
As shown above, the European Court in both Gourdain and De
Cavel favored a Community solution in relation to the interpretation of
the Article 1 exceptions. The Court made a similar decision in Socit
Bertrand v. Ott,54 in relation to Articles 13-15, and in Industrial Dia-
mond Supplies v. Riva,55 in relation to Article 38. The latter decision,
however, is unsatisfactory and could lead to uncertainty. The specific
question in the case was whether or not an appeal to the Italian Court
of Cassation was an ordinary appeal under Article 38. That Article
provides that a court hearing an appeal against an order for enforce-
ment may stay the proceedings "if an ordinary appeal has been lodged
against the judgment in the State in which that judgment was given or
if the time for such an appeal has not yet expired."56 Views differ as
between the various Member States on the nature of appeals in cassa-
tion, and strong arguments were put forward in favor of classifying
such an appeal according to the law of the judgment-granting state.
The European Court, however, was unconvinced by such argu-
ments, and held firmly to the belief that the concept must have a Com-
munity law meaning. Otherwise, the Court noted, the same kind of
appeal could be classed differently, depending upon the country in
question. Perhaps the search for uniformity was taken too far here,
since classification according to national law would have produced
quite satisfactory results. The European Court, however, thought that
a broad interpretation of the concept must be given to provide the judg-
ment-recognizing court the ability to grant a stay whenever reasonable
doubt arises about the decision's fate in the state in which it was ren-
dered. The main characteristic of an ordinary appeal, according to the
53 Id
54 [1978] E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1431, [1978] 3 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 499.
55 [1977] E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 2175, [1978] 1 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 349.
56 Judgments Convention, supra note 13, at art. 38.
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Court, is that it must result in either the annulment or amendment of
the judgment.
B. Strict Construction
The European Court's general approach towards exceptions to
Community law principles has been to construe them strictly in order
to promote the "effet utile" of the EEC Treaty. This approach is evi-
denced in the Court's interpretation of Article 36 of the Treaty, and
also in the decisions on the public policy exception to the free move-
ment of persons, contained in Directive 64/221.17 The European Court
follows the same approach under the Convention.
The Convention contains a number of exceptions to the general
principles. If the principles were to be given a very wide inteipretation,
they would tend to undermine the uniformity that the Convention is
designed to achieve. The first set of exceptions is in Article 5, which
provides bases of jurisdiction in addition to the general rule specified in
Article 2. As the European Court observed in Somafer v. Saar-
Ferngas,
[m]ultiplication of the bases ofjurisdiction in one and the same case is not
likely to encourage legal certainty and the effectiveness of legal protection
throughout the territory of the Community and therefore it is in accord
with the objective of the Convention to avoid a wide and multifarious
interpretation of the exceptions to the general rule of jurisdiction con-
tained in Article 2.58
In De Bloos v. Bouyer, a case concerning the breach of a distribu-
tion agreement, the European Court ruled on the meaning of "obliga-
tion" in Article 5(1)60 and "branch, agency or other establishment" in
Article 5(5).61 As noted above, Article 5(1) of the Judgments Conven-
tion gives jurisdiction, in contract cases, to the courts of the place of
performance of the obligation. The Court in its interpretation of Arti-
cle 5(1) referred to the general principle that the number of courts hay-
57 OJ. EUR. COMM. 117 (Spec. Ed. 1963-64).
58 Somafer v. Saar-Ferngas, [1978] E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at 2191, [1979] 1 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at
502.
59 [1976] E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1497, [1977] 1 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 60.
60 Judgments Convention, supra note 13, at art. 5(l). For the text of Article 5(1), see note 46
supra.
61 Article 5(5) of the Judgments Convention provides that:
[a] person domiciled in a contracting State may, in another contracting State, be sued:
(5) as regards a dispute arising out of the operations of a branch, agency or other estab-
lishment, in the courts for the place in which the branch, agency, or other establish-
ment is situated;
Judgments Convention, supra note 13, at art. 5(5).
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ing jurisdiction should be strictly limited. It then decided that the
"obligation" under Article 5(1) is that part of the agreement allegedly
violated which forms the basis of the legal proceedings.
The Court also seemed to have strict construction in mind when it
examined Article 5(5). It found that the holder of an exclusive sales
concession could not be regarded as a "branch, agency or other estab-
lishment" for purposes of the Article.62 It supported its view by saying
that an essential characteristic of a branch, agency or other establish-
ment is it be subject to the grantor's direction and control.63 Although
perhaps true for branches and agencies, it is unclear why the grantor's
direction and control is essential for "other establishments" as well.
The European Court will, however, avoid interpreting exceptions
to Community law principles so strictly as to deprive such exceptions of
any useful effect. In Bier v. Mines de Potasse,6 the Court was called
upon to interpret the exception in Article 5(3) of the Convention which
provides that tort actions may be brought "in the courts for the place
where the harmful event occurred." 65 The case involved the sensitive
subject of the pollution of the Rhine. A Dutch nursery owner, relying
on water from the Rhine for irrigation, brought suit against a French
company that discharged large quantities of chloride daily into the
Rhine. The action originally brought before the Dutch court raised
questions as to the basis of its jurisdiction. The European Court, how-
ever, ruled that Article 5(3) gives jurisdiction both to the court of the
place where the defendant acted and to the court of the place where the
harm occurred.66 The Court rejected the interpretation that jurisdic-
tion should be given only to the court of the place where the defendant
acted on the grounds that the place of the defendant's act will often be
the same as that of his domicile. It noted that since domicile is an
independent basis of jurisdiction under Article 2, Article 5(3) would be
deprived of any effect if interpreted to give jurisdiction only to the
court of the place of the defendant's act. It should again be noted that
the European Court adopted a Community solution, and did not refer
the question back to the national court, as in Tessili v. Dunlop.67
In addition to the extra bases of jurisdiction set out in Article 5, the
62 De Bloos v. Bouyer, [1976] E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at 1510, [1977] 1 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 82.
63 Id
64 [1976] E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1735, [1977] 1 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 284.
65 Judgments Convention, supra note 13, at art. 5(3).
66 Bier v. Mines de Potasse, [1976] E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at 1748, [1977] 1 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at
301.
67 Tessili v. Dunlop, [1976] E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1473, [1977] 1 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 26.
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Convention also provides special rules on insurance contracts68 and in-
stallment sales and loans, or "consumer contracts" 69 as they are known
under the revised Convention. In relation to the latter, Socite Bertrand
v. 01t70 provides an interesting example of the European Court's policy
of strict construction. Article 14 provides that the seller/lender may be
sued either in the Member State in which he is domiciled, or in the
Member State in which the buyer/borrower is domiciled, but that the
buyer/borrower may be sued only in the Member State in which he is
domiciled. These rules can be ousted by a choice of jurisdiction clause,
that (1) is entered into after the dispute arises, (2) allows the buyer/
borrower to bring proceedings in other courts, or (3) confers jurisdic-
tion on a Member State where both parties are habitually resident. It
should also be noted that, contrary to the general principle of the Con-
vention that judgments given in one Contracting State shall be auto-
matically recognized in another, a court may refuse to recognize a
judgment if the above rules have not been complied with.71 'This also
applies to the rules on insurance contracts, and to Article 16,72 which
provides for exclusive jurisdiction. In Bertrand v. Ot1, Ott made an in-
stalment sale of machinery to Bertrand. After Bertrand defaulted, Ott
obtained judgment in the German courts and then sought to enforce it
in France. The Cour de Cassation referred the question of whether this
was an installment credit sale to the European Court.
The European Court ruled that the term "installment credit sale"
must be given a narrow definition, since Articles 13-15 constitute an
exception to the general principles of the Convention. It believed a
Community law definition was necessary, since the concept varies from
State to State. Additionally, the Court thought that any other solution
might lead to particular difficulties in light of the possibility of review-
ing judgments in the course of the recognition procedure. The objec-
tive pursued by these provisions, according to the Court, is to protect
the economically weaker party, and therefore it concluded that only
consumer transactions were envisaged.7' It is interesting to note that
this solution is expressly adopted in the revised Convention.7 4
68 Judgments Convention, supra note 13, at arts. 7-12.
69 Id at arts. 13-15.
70 [1978] E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1431, [1978] 3 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 499.
71 Judgments Convention, supra note 13, at art. 27.
72 Id at art. 16.
73 Bertrand v. Ott, [1978] E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at 1446, [1978] 3 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 510.
74 Judgments Convention, supra note 13, at art. 13. Article 13 provides that:
[i]n proceedings concerning a contract concluded by a person for a purpose which can be
regarded as being outside his trade or profession, hereinafter called the consumer, jurisdic-
tion shall be determined, by this section. ...
Id
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As noted, the Convention provides for exclusive jurisdiction in
certain cases falling within Article 16.75 Unlike the preceding articles
on special jurisdiction, Article 16 supercedes the general principle of
Article 2, which gives jurisdiction to the courts of the defendant's domi-
cile. Paragraph 1 of Article 16 covers "proceedings which have as their
object rights in rem in, or tenancies of, immovable property," and pro-
vides that the courts of the Contracting States where the property is
situated shall have exclusive jurisdiction.76 Following its general policy
of strict construction, the European Court has held that these provi-
sions granting exclusive jurisdiction ought not be given a wider inter-
pretation than is required by their objective, since the provisions
deprive the parties of any choice of forum.
In Sanders v. Van der Pute,77 Article 16(1) was at issue. The case
involved an agreement between two Dutchmen, under which Sanders
would take over Van der Putte's flower shop business in Germany.
The shop was on rented premises, and the agreement provided that
Sanders should pay the main rent to the landlord together with some
additional rent to Van der Putte. When Sanders later disputed -the
agreement, Van der Putte brought an action in Holland for specific per-
formance. Sanders contested the jurisdiction of the Dutch courts on
the grounds that the case concerned a tenancy of immovable property
in Germany. However, contrary to the view taken by the Advocate
General, the Court found that Article 16(1) did not cover the matter at
issue, and therefore held that the Dutch courts had jurisdiction.7" The
Court ruled that Article 16(1) applied only to such matters as disputes
between lessors and tenants over either the interpretation or existence
of a lease, compensation for damage caused by the tenant, or the giving
up of possession, but that it did not extend to an agreement for the
operation of a business on leased premises.79
The trend towards strict construction has been mitigated some-
what by the European Court's decisions on Article 17. That Article
provides an exception to the basic principle of Article 2 by conferring
exclusive jurisdiction where there is a valid choice of jurisdiction
clause. Article 17 provides that it shall apply:
if the Parties, one or more of whom is domiciled in a Contracting State,
have, by agreement in writing or by an agreement evidenced in writing,
75 Judgments Convention, supra note 13, at art. 16.
76 Id.
77 [1977] E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 2383, [1978] 1 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 331.
78 Id
79 Id at 2392, [1978] 1 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 344.
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agreed that a court or the courts of a Contracting State are to have juris-
diction to settle any disputes .... 80
The revised Convention states that Article 17 shall also apply in inter-
national trade or commerce when the agreement "accords with prac-
tices in that trade or commerce of which the parties are or ought to
have been aware."'" The use of the singular in the phrase "a court or
the courts of a Contracting State" has given rise to a European Court
decision that, despite its wording, Article 17 does allow the parties to
choose two or more courts in different Contracting States. Thus, in
Meeth v. Glacetal,8u a choice of jurisdiction clause that permitted suit
against the German party to the agreement only before the German
courts, and suit against the French company only before the French
authorities, was upheld. Sued in a German court, the German party
claimed a set-off, but the court held this inadmissible because accord-
ing to the choice of jurisdiction clause all claims against the French
company had to be brought before the French courts. The European
Court, however, found that Article 17 did not preclude the German
court from considering a claim for a set-off in these circumstances, yet
it is unclear whether this finding would extend to a counterclaim. 83
The Advocate General in the case, Mr. Capotorti, distinguished be-
tween set-offs and counterclaims on the grounds that the former are
essentially defenses whereas the latter are independent; therefore he
concluded that counterclaims should be governed by the choice of ju-
risdiction clause.84
The European Court did not take a particularly strict approach in
Colzani v. Ru WA,85 when ruling on the Article 17 requirement of a
writing. The case involved a standard form contract for the sale of
machinery from a German firm to an Italian company. The European
Court held, quite rightly, that where the conditions of sale (including
the choice of jurisdiction clause) are printed on the back of the docu-
ments, the contract must contain an express reference to those provi-
sions.86 The Court went on to say, however, that if the contract
expressly refers to a prior offer in writing that referred to the general
conditions of sale (including a choice of jurisdiction clause) and those
80 Judgments Convention, supra note 13, at art. 17.
81 Id
82 [1978] E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 2133, [1979] 1 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 520.
83 Id
84 Id. at 2147, [1979] 1 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 522 (opinion of Advocate General Capotorti).
85 [1976] E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1831, [1977] 1 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 345.
86 Id at 1842, [1977] 1 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 356.
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general conditions were in fact communicated, 7 then the requirement
of a writing will be satisfied.
Colzani should be compared with Segoura v. Bonakdarian,88 a case
where an oral agreement preceded a written confirmation that had the
conditions of sale endorsed on the back. The Court took a stricter view
in this case, and held that even where an oral agreement stipulated that
the general conditions are to apply, the transaction is unenforceable
unless the written confirmation containing the choice of jurisdiction
clause is signed or accepted in writing by the party to whom it is
presented. 9 A strict approach to the formal requirements of Article 17
was also taken in Porta-Leasing v. Prestige International,9" a case that
concerned Article 1(2) of the Protocol annexed to the Convention.9
Article 1(2) sets out even more stringent conditions than Article 17 for
persons domiciled in Luxembourg. It provides that such persons must
"expressly and specifically" agree to a choice of jurisdiction clause. 92
The European Court held that the signing of the entire contract was
insufficient to bind the parties, unless the provision itself was signed
and was specifically and exclusively devoted to the choice of
jurisdiction. 93
The validity of a choice of jurisdiction clause arose in Sanicentral
v. Collin."' In 1971 a contract was entered into between a Frenchman
and a German company, containing a choice of jurisdiction clause in
favor of the German courts. Such a clause is invalid under French law
where incorporated into an employment contract. The question re-
ferred by the Cour de Cassation did not ask which law governed the
validity of the choice of jurisdiction clause. Instead, it asked whether
Article 17 could apply in proceedings brought after the Convention
came into force to a contract entered into prior to that date. The Euro-
pean Court held that the Convention did apply, on the grounds that a
choice of jurisdiction clause can have no legal application until pro-
ceedings are instituted and that, therefore, the French courts had no
jurisdiction.95 The European Court ignored the question of which law
governs the validity of a choice of jurisdiction clause, but instead
87 Id
88 [1976] E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1851, [1977] 1 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 361.
89 Id at 1862, [1977] 1 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 372.
90 [1980] E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1517, [1981] 1 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 135.
91 Protocol, supra note 4, at art. 1(2).
92 ld
93 Porta-Leasing v. Prestige Int'l, [1980] E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at 1524, [1981] 1 Comm. Mkt.
L.R. at 142.
94 [1979] E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 3423, [1980] 2 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 164.
95 Id at 3430, [1980] 2 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 173.
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seemed to assume its validity if it complied with the requirement of a
writing contained in Article 17.
The policy of strict construction was not, however, followed in
Zelger v. Salinitri,96 a case that concerned the relationship between Ar-
ticle 5(1) and Article 17. In Zelger, a debt action brought by a German
against an Italian before a German court, the plaintiff alleged an ex-
press oral agreement that specified Munich as the place to repay the
loan. The question referred by the Bundesgerichtshof was alterna-
tively, whether its jurisdiction failed due to the fact that the formal
requirements of Article 17 had not been complied with or whether ju-
risdiction was sufficiently based upon Article 5(1) in that the informal
agreement was effective under national law.97 The European Court
opted for the latter solution and held that compliance with Article 17
was not necessary.98 This approach, of course, follows from the Court's
decision in Tessili v. Dunlop," where it held that the place of perform-
ance, depends upon the governing law of the contract according to the
conflict of law rules of the forum. It follows, therefore, that an agree-
ment should be enforceable if it is valid without further formality ac-
cording to the national law applicable to the contract.
C Equality of Treatment
The Convention has the purpose of harmonizing jurisdictional
rules, 'as well as that of imposing the duty to recognize judgments.
Consequently, the equality of treatment principle is bound to be impor-
tant in the interpretation of the Convention, since that principle is the
foundation for the harmonization of laws within the EEC. The princi-
ple is-enunciated in Article 7 of the EEC Treaty where it provides that
"any ,discrimination on the grounds of nationality shall be
prohibited."'"°
The principle of non-discrimination within the EEC does not,
under'the Convention, extend coverage to persons not domiciled within
the EEC. As mentioned above, the basic rule of jurisdiction expressed
in Article 2 is that persons domiciled in the territory of a Contracting
State shall, irrespective of their nationality, be sued in the courts of that
State. So-called rules of "exorbitant jurisdiction," specified in Article
96 [1980] E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 89, [1980] 2 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 635.
97 Judgments Convention, supra note 13, at art. 5(1). For the text of Article 5(1), see note 46
supra.
98 Zelger v. Salinitri, [1980] E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at 97, [1980] 2 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 643.
99 See note 45 and accompanying text supra.
100 EEC Treaty, supra note 2, at art. 7.
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3, are not available against such persons. The converse of this situation
is contained in the controversial Article 4, which provides that:
If the defendant is not domiciled in a Contracting State, the jurisdiction
of the courts of each Contracting State shall, subject to the provisions of
Article 16, be determined by the law of that State.' 0 '
Persons not domiciled in the EEC, therefore, will still be subject to the
rules of exorbitant jurisdiction. The rule of non-discrimination con-
tained in Article 7 of the EEC Treaty is pushed to its logical conclusion
in the second paragraph of Article 4 of the Convention, which actually
extends the rules of exorbitant jurisdiction vis-a-vis non-domiciliar-
ies. 1 2 Thus, where the rules of exorbitant jurisdiction are based upon
the nationality of the plaintiff, any person domiciled in the EEC will
now be able to rely upon the same rules. This extraordinary result is
justified by the principle of equality of treatment within the EEC.
The Convention does, however, allow a Contracting State to enter
into conventions with third countries, containing an obligation "not to
recognize judgments given in other Contracting States against defend-
ants domiciled or habitually resident in the third state where, in cases
provided for in Article 4, the judgment could only be founded on a
ground of jurisdiction specified in the second paragraph of Article
3."103 After the signing of the Convention of Accession it was proposed
that the United Kingdom should conclude a Convention with the
United States on Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments. These
negotiations were terminated, however, since many believed such a
convention might prove harmful in view of the very high damages
awarded by American juries, especially in personal injury and product
liability cases.
The European Court has made reference to the equality of treat-
ment principle a number of times in its judgments on the Convention.
In LTU v. Eurocontrol, the Court said that the meaning of the phrase
"civil and commercial matters" could not depend upon national law,
because that would prevent the obligations from being uniform for all
Contracting States."° The same approach was adopted in Somafer v.
101 Judgments Convention, supra note 13, at art. 4.
102 The second para. of Article 4 provides that:
[als against such a defendant, any person domiciled in a contracting State may, whatever his
nationality, avail himself in that State of the rules of jurisdiction there in force, and in partic-
ular those specified in the second paragraph of Article 3, in the same way as the nationals of
that State.
Judgments Convention, supra note 13, at art. 4.
103 Id at art. 59.
104 LTUv. Eurocontrol, [1976] E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1541, 1551, [1977] 1 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 88,
100.
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Ferngas, where the Court in providing a Community law interpretation
to Article 5(5), directed attention to the need for equality between
parties.10 5
The equality of treatment principle also underlies two decisions on
Title III of the Convention which sets out the rules on recognition and
enforcement.10 6 De Wolf v. Cox 107 addressed the question of whether a
judgment may be enforced only through the procedure laid down in
the Convention or by other methods as well. De Wolf, after obtaining
judgment in a Belgian Court against Cox for 23 guilders, attempted to
enforce it in the Netherlands. In view of the sum involved, he brought
an independent action in a Dutch small claims court rather than follow
the more costly procedure set out in the Convention. The European
Court held that the only procedure permissible for enforcing judgments
was that provided for under the Convention.108 Although the Court
did not base its opinion on the equality of treatment principle, but
rather on the dubious grounds of infringement of Articles 21 and 29, it
is clear that any other solution would have infringed the equality of
treatment principle since the availability of alternative procedures dif-
fer from country to country. .
In Denilauler v. SNC Couchet Freres,109 an attachment order had
been made in France under the Code de Procedure Civile on the ex
parte application of the creditor. In determining whether the order
could be enforced in Germany without first having been served on the
other party, the European Court held that rights of defense must be
observed. The Court concluded that judicial decisions authorizing pro-
visional or protective measures, if taken without summoning the party
to whom they are addressed to appear and if intended to be enforced
without giving advance notice, are not covered by Title III of the Con-
vention. Once again the European Court read a general principle into
the Convention in order to promote equality of treatment.
CONCLUSION
From the foregoing, it is apparent that the European Court pur-
sues a definite policy in its interpretation of the Convention, a policy
that is justified in so far as it is based upon a desire for uniformity in
the application of the Convention. The present writer does not share
105 Somafer v. Saar-Ferngas, [1978] E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 2183, [1979] 1 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 490.
106 Judgments Convention, supra note 13, at arts. 25-49.
107 [1976] E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1759, [1977] 2 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 12.
108 Id at 1768, [1977] 2 Comm. MkL L.R. at 56.
109 [1980] E. Comm. CL J. Rep. 1553, [1981] 1 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 62.
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the view expressed by Giardina that the approach in Tessili v. Dunlop is
preferable to adopting a Community solution.110 There is, however, no
doubt that the Court's policy emphasizes its role under the reference
procedure as the ultimate arbiter of the interpretation of the Conven-
tion. The authors of the Convention chose the bolder method of har-
monizing the jurisdictional base and imposing the obligation to
recognize, rather than the less ambitious method of a multilateral con-
vention dealing with recognition alone. This policy of harmonization
can best be served by the European Court of Justice's adoption of
Community solutions to the problems of interpretation arising under
the Convention. The solution proposed by Giardina would have the
European Court merely indicate which national law was to apply in a
given issue. Such a proposal, if adopted, would amount to an abdica-
tion of the Court's responsibility for the Convention. While the adop-
tion of Community solutions may lead to initial uncertainty, this can be
remedied by further references to the European Court. It can only be
regretted that the Protocol conferring jurisdiction on the European
Court imposes a limitation on the courts entitled to refer such
questions.
110 Giardina, The European Court and the Brussels Convention on Jurisdiction and Judgments,
27 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 263, 276 (1978).
